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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED § 78-2-2(3)0'). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Issue: Whether the district court erred in concluding that an individual 
unit in a ten-unit condominium building constitutes a "residence" as that term is defined 
in UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-102(20). 
a. Standard of Review: Questions of statutory interpretation are 
reviewed for correctness. Bearden v. Croft, 2001 UT 76, Tf 5, 31 P.3d 537. 
b. Record Citation: This issue was raised in Superior Insulation Co., 
Inc.'s Objection to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Proposed Judgment 
and Order on Defendants Janet Heidt, Guy G. Berryessa, Curt G. Hood, and Jennifer C. 
Smith's Motions for Summary Judgment (Record on Appeal [hereafter "R."] 429-30), 
Superior Insulation Co., Inc.'s memoranda in opposition to the unit owners' motions for 
summary judgment (R. 478-79, 511-12), and at oral argument on the unit owners' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Transcript of Hearing on Motions, February 4, 2002 
[hereafter "Tr."] 675-76, 690-92.) 
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2. Issue: Whether the district court erred in concluding that the provisions of 
the Condominium Ownership Act mandate that a unit in a ten-unit condominium 
building be considered a "residence" under UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-102(20). 
a. Standard of Review: Questions of statutory interpretation are 
reviewed for correctness. Bearden, 2001 UT 76 at j^ 5. 
b. Record Citation: This issue was raised at oral argument on the unit 
owners' Motions for Summary Judgment. (Tr. 675-76, 690-92.) 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
The relevant issues are governed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-102(20), a section 
contained in the Utah Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act, and UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 57-8-19(1), § 57-8-27, and § 57-8-35, sections contained in the Utah 
Condominium Ownership Act. These statutory provisions are set forth in full in the 
Addendum (hereafter, "Add.") at 26. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
CraCar Construction Company ("CraCar") was hired by Bear Hollow Village, 
LLC to act as the general contractor for the Bear Hollow Village Subdivision project (the 
"Project") in Park City, Utah. CraCar hired various subcontractors to work on the 
Project. Bear Hollow Village, LLC failed to pay CraCar for a substantial portion of the 
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work performed on the Project, and, as a result, CraCar was unable to pay its 
subcontractors for the work they performed. CraCar and its subcontractors recorded 
mechanic's liens against the Project. Despite its failure to pay CraCar, Bear Hollow 
Village, LLC sold a number of condominium units to individual purchasers. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
LKL Associates, Inc. ("LKL") filed an action which included a claim to foreclose 
mechanic's liens against certain condominium lots within the Project. LKL named as 
defendants the individual owners of the condominium units and other contractors who 
had recorded mechanic's liens against the units. Two defendants, Superior Plumbing and 
Heating, Inc. and Superior Insulation Co., Inc., filed counterclaims, cross-claims, and 
third party complaints against unit owners and other lien claimants. Superior Plumbing 
and Superior Insulation, who were CraCar's subcontractors on the Project, named 
CraCar as a defendant in their third-party complaints. 
Each of the owners of the condominium units (Janet Heidt, Guy G. Berryessa, 
Curt G. Hood, Jennifer C. Smith, and Ann M. Farley [hereafter, "Unit Owners"]) 
submitted a completed Answer, Affidavit, and Motion for Summary Judgment form 
which UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) requires mechanic's lien claimants to serve 
along with the summons and complaint in a mechanic's lien foreclosure action. The Unit 
Owners sought summary judgment based upon the defenses provided by the Residence 
Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act (the "Lien Restriction Act"). Several 
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contractor parties objected to the motions for summary judgment because each 
condominium unit in question was part of a ten-unit condominium building. The Lien 
Restriction Act applies only if a property is a "residence" which the Lien Restriction Act 
defines as a "detached single-family dwelling or multifamily dwelling up to two units . . . 
." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-102(20). The owners did not dispute that their 
condominium units were housed in a building containing ten attached units. 
III. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
After a hearing on the owners' motions for summary judgment, the trial court 
ruled that each condominium unit constituted a "residence" under the Lien Restriction 
Act and that the lien claimant parties were required to remove their mechanic's liens and 
dismiss their claims against the owners. The court further directed that the judgments be 
entered as final judgments pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
CraCar appeals the trial court's ruling. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CraCar entered into a contract with a developer, Bear Hollow Village, LLC, to act 
as the general contractor for the Project. CraCar retained subcontractors to provide work 
on certain condominium units in the Project. (R. 102, 193.) Without paying CraCar for 
its work, Bear Hollow Village, LLC sold a number of the condominium units in the 
Project to the Unit Owners. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Home 
Owners' Motions for Summary Judgment [hereafter, "First Findings"], Addendum 
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["Add."] 2-4; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Ann M. Farley's Motion for 
Summary Judgment [hereafter, "Second Findings"], Add. 10-12 .) CraCar and its 
subcontractors filed mechanic's liens against the Project to secure payment for the work 
they had performed. (R. 104-07, 198-200.) Some of CraCar's subcontractors initiated a 
lien foreclosure action against the Unit Owners and named CraCar as a party to the 
action. (R. at 104-07, 198-200.). The Unit Owners filed motions for summary judgment 
based upon the Lien Restriction Act. (R. 131,163, 203, 227 & 400.) CraCar and its 
subcontractors objected to the motions on the basis that the protections of the Lien 
Restriction Act are only extended to owners of "residences" and that the Lien Restriction 
Act defines a "residence" as "a primary or secondary detached single-family dwelling or 
multifamily dwelling up to two units." (R. 429-30, 478-79, 511-12; Tr. 675-76, 690-92.) 
Because the Unit Owners owned condominium units housed in buildings containing ten 
attached units, CraCar and its subcontractors argued that the Lien Restriction Act's 
protections were not available to the Unit Owners. (Tr. 675-76, 690-92.) 
After oral argument on the Unit Owners' motions for summary judgment, the trial 
court granted the Unit Owners' motions for summary judgment. (Add. 1-27.) In support 
of its ruling, the trial court concluded that: (1) "so long as an owner of a residential unit 
in a condominium building does not own more than two units, that owner qualifies for 
the protection afforded by the [Act]"; (2) "the conclusion that each of the condominium 
units described in the foregoing Findings of Fact qualifies as a 'residence' is mandated 
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by the provisions of the Condominium Ownership Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-1, et 
seq."; and (3) "[i]f the definition of residence were to be construed as excluding 
condominium units, the statute may be unconstitutional under the equal protection 
provision of the Utah Constitution, Article I, § 24." (First Findings, Add. 4-6, Second 
Findings, Add. 16-19.) 
Because one of the Unit Owners (Ann M. Farley) was inadvertently omitted from 
the first Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and the first Judgment and Order, an 
additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an additional Judgment and 
Order were entered by the trial court to extend the relief granted to the other Unit Owners 
to Ms. Farley. (Second Findings, Add. 14-21; Add. 22-27.) The Findings, Judgment, 
and Order pertaining to Ms. Farley were identical to those entered for the other Unit 
Owners. Although CraCar filed a separate Notice of Appeal relating to the Findings, 
Judgment, and Order pertaining to Ms. Farley, the legal issues are the same as those 
relating to the Findings, Judgment, and Order pertaining to the other Unit Owners. 
CraCar requests that the appeal of the Findings, Judgment, and Order relating to Ms. 
Farley be consolidated with the appeal of the Findings, Judgment, and Order relating to 
the other Unit Owners. 
CraCar now appeals the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
the Judgments and Orders pertaining to the Unit Owners. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Lien Restriction Act provides certain owners of residences protection from 
mechanic's liens. The term "residence" is defined by the Lien Restriction Act as a 
"detached single-family dwelling or multifamily dwelling up to two units . . . . " Because 
each of the Unit Owners in the present case own a unit in a condominium building 
housing ten units, the plain language of the statute indicates that the Unit Owners are not 
entitled to the protections of the Lien Restriction Act. 
The provisions of Utah's Condominium Ownership Act do not alter the Lien 
Restriction Act's definition of "residence." Because there is no conflict between the 
Utah Condominium Ownership Act and the Lien Restriction Act, the two enactments 
coexist without one prevailing over the other. 
Although the trial court stated in dicta that the Lien Restriction Act "may" be 
unconstitutional, the constitutional argument was never properly presented to the trial 
court, and the trial court did not rely on this argument in entering its ruling. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. OWNERS OF UNITS IN MULTIFAMILY DWELLINGS HOUSING 
MORE THAN TWO UNITS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE 
PROTECTIONS OF THE LIEN RESTRICTION ACT 
A. The Lien Restriction Act Applies to "Residences" Only 
The trial court's ruling defied the plain language of the Lien Restriction Act. The 
Lien Restriction Act explicitly provides that its protections against mechanic's liens are 
limited to owners of "residences": 
A person qualified to file a lien upon an owner-occupied residence and the 
real property associated with that residence . . . shall be barred.. .from 
maintaining a lien upon that residence and real property or recovering a 
judgment in any civil action against the owner or the owner-occupied 
residence to recover monies owed for qualified services provided by that 
person if [certain enumerated conditions are met]. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-107(1) (emphasis added). The Lien Restriction Act does not 
purport to bar mechanic's liens against improvements which are not "residences." Only 
those who are deemed "owners" under the Lien Restriction Act and who comply with the 
necessary provisions may compel the removal of the mechanic's lien: 
A lien claimant who files a mechanics' lien or foreclosure action upon an 
owner-occupied residence is not liable for costs and attorneys' fees under 
Sections 38-1-17 and 38-1-18 or for any damages arising from a civil 
action related to the lien filing or foreclosure action if the lien claimant 
removes the lien within ten days from the date the owner establishes 
compliance, through written findings of fact from a court of competent 
jurisdiction or, in cases where a bankruptcy has been filed, from the 
director, with the requirements of Subsections 38-1 l-204(3)(a) and (3)(b). 
8 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-107(3). The Lien Restriction Act defines an "owner" as one 
who contracts with a real estate developer or a licensed contractor to purchase a 
"residence" upon completion of construction or one who buys a completed "residence" 
from a real estate developer. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-102(15). Clearly, the relief 
awarded by the trial court to the Unit Owners can only be awarded under the Lien 
Restriction Act to owners of "residences." 
B. The Lien Restriction Act Defines "Residence" as Dwellings With No 
More Than Two Units 
The Lien Restriction Act defines "residence" as follows: 
"Residence" means an improvement to real property used or occupied, to 
be used or occupied as, or in conjunction with, a primary or secondary 
detached single-family dwelling or multifamily dwelling up to two units, 
including factory built housing. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-102(20). There are several elements to this definition. First, 
a residence must be some type of improvement to real property. Second, the 
improvement must be intended for use or occupation as (or in conjunction with) a 
primary or secondary dwelling. Third, the dwelling must be either a "detached single-
family dwelling" or a "multifamily dwelling up to two units." This third element — 
whether the dwelling is either a detached single-family dwelling or a multifamily 
dwelling with no more than two units — is the critical issue presented in this appeal. 
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C. A Condominium Unit in a Building Containing Ten Units Does Not 
Constitute a "Residence" 
The Unit Owners in the present case reside in units in the Calgary Condominium 
complex within the Project. The Calgary Condominium complex consists of two 
buildings, each of which contains ten separate condominium units. (First Findings, 
Add. 4; Second Findings, Add. 16.) Because the units owned by the Unit Owners are 
contained within multifamily dwellings with more than two units, the Unit Owners are 
not entitled to the protections of the Lien Restriction Act. Any contrary conclusion 
defies the plain language of the Lien Restriction Act. 
The trial court concluded that the definition of residence "focuses on the character 
of the ownership of the residence" and that "so long as an owner of a residential unit in a 
condominium building does not own more that two units, that owner qualifies for the 
protection afforded by the statute." (First Findings, Add. 4; Second Findings, Add. 16.) 
These conclusions are entirely unsupported by the text of the Lien Restriction Act. 
Section 38-11-102(2) does not contain the words "own," "owner," or "ownership." It is 
difficult to understand how the trial court could conclude that this provision "focuses on 
the character of ownership of the residence." It is equally puzzling that the trial court 
construed the words "a . . . multifamily dwelling up to two units" to mean "a dwelling 
with any number of units so long as the homeowner in question owns no more than two 
units within that dwelling." 
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The rules promulgated for the implementation of the Lien Restriction Act require 
the creation of a form for use by homeowners which "shall be an answer, affidavit, and 
motion for summary judgment that is clearly written and easy to understand." UTAH 
ADMIN. CODE R156-38-109. Lien claimants are required by statute to serve a blank copy 
of the form upon each homeowner along with the summons and complaint. UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 38-1-11(4). The answer, affidavit, and motion for summary judgment form 
created by the Lien Recovery Fund, which was completed and filed by each of the Unit 
Owners, includes the following sentence to be filled in by the homeowner: 
( ) I am the owner of a residence, which has an address of 
, located in the city or county of , Utah, 
which is a single family or duplex residence. 
(R. 131^163, 203, 227 (emphasis added.)) It is interesting to note that the form does not 
request whether the affiant owns more than one unit in the dwelling in question. The 
language of the form indicates that the Lien Recovery Fund considers any multifamily 
dwelling larger than a duplex to be ineligible for the protections of the Lien Restriction 
Act. 
II. THE CONDOMINIUM OWNERSHIP ACT DOES NOT TRANSFORM 
LARGE MULTIFAMILY BUILDINGS INTO "RESIDENCES" 
The trial court also ruled that the Utah Condominium Ownership Act mandates 
the conclusion that "each of the condominium units [at issue] qualifies as a 
'residence'...." (First Findings, Add. 5; Second Findings, Add. 17.) Specifically, the 
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trial court relied upon three sections of the Condominium Ownership Act in reaching this 
conclusion: Section 57-8-19(1) regarding liens against condominium units; Section 
57-8-27 regarding separate taxation of condominium units; and Section 57-8-35 
regarding-the integration of other laws with the Condominium Ownership Act. (First 
Findings, Add. 4; Second Findings, Add. 16.) Because none of these sections provides a 
basis for altering the plain language of the Lien Restriction Act, the trial court erred in 
applying the Lien Restriction Act's protections to units in a ten-unit condominium. 
A. Section 57-18-19(1) Does Not Alter the Lien Restriction Act's 
Definition of "Residence" 
The Condominium Ownership Act provides that liens may be created against 
condominium units in the same manner that liens are created against other real properly: 
[W]hile the property remains subject to this ac t , . . . liens or encumbrances 
shall arise or be created only against each unit and the percentage of 
undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant to such 
unit in the same manner and under the same conditions in every respect as 
liens or encumbrances may arise or be created upon or against any other 
separate parcel of real property subject to individual ownership. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-19(1). The trial court apparently concluded that this provision 
served to transform condominium units into "separate parcel[s] of real property" which 
are considered detached for purposes of the Lien Restriction Act. To the contrary, this 
provision simply clarifies that condominium units are susceptible to the same liens and 
encumbrances which arise against non-condominium properties. Nothing in this section 
states that condominium units are "separate parcel[s] of real property" — the section 
12 
simply states that the procedures for creating a lien against separate parcels of real 
property are valid to create liens against condominium units. 
B. Section 57-8-27 Does Not Convert Condominium Units Into Detached 
Dwellings 
The Condominium Ownership Act provides that each condominium unit is subject 
to separate taxation: 
Each unit and its percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and 
facilities shall be considered to be a parcel and shall be subject to separate 
assessment and taxation by each assessing unit and special district for all 
types of taxes authorized by law, including ad valorem levies and special 
assessments. Neither the building or buildings, the property, nor any of the 
common areas and facilities may be considered a parcel. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-27(1). However, nothing in this section suggests that a ten-unit 
condominium building should be deemed a "detached single-family dwelling" or a 
"multifamily dwelling up to two units" for purposes of the Lien Restriction Act. 
C. The Application of the Condominium Ownership Act Does Not 
Conflict With the Lien Restriction Act 
The Condominium Ownership Act contains provisions regarding the relationship 
between its provisions and other laws: 
The provisions of this chapter shall be in addition to and supplemental to 
all other provisions of law, statutory or judicially declared, provided that 
wherever the application of the provisions of this chapter conflict with the 
application of such other provisions, this chapter shall prevail: provided 
further, forpurposes of Sections 10-9-805, 10-9-811, and 17-27-804 and 
provisions of similar import and any law or ordinance adopted pursuant 
thereto, a condominium project shall be considered to be a subdivision, and 
a record of survey map or supplement thereto prepared pursuant to this 
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chapter shall be considered to be a subdivision map or plat, only with 
respect to: 
(a) such real property or improvements, if any, as are intended to be 
dedicated to the use of the public in connection with the creation of 
the condominium project or portion thereof concerned; and 
(b) those units, if any, included in the condominium project or 
portion thereof concerned which are not contained in existing or 
proposed buildings. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-35(1). In short, if the Condominium Ownership Act conflicts 
with other provisions of law, the Condominium Ownership Act prevails. If there is no 
conflict, the Condominium Ownership act is "in addition to and supplemental to all other 
provisions of law." The trial court apparently concluded that there was a conflict 
between the Condominium Ownership Act and the Lien Restriction Act and that the 
former prevailed. In fact, there is no conflict between the Condominium Ownership Act 
and the Lien Restriction Act. 
The trial court did not specify any provision of the Condominium Ownership Act 
which allegedly conflicted with the Lien Restriction Act. In fact, the Condominium 
Ownership Act explicitly states that condominium units are not treated differently for 
purposes of the creation of liens: "liens or encumbrances. . . shal l . . . be created . . . 
against each un i t . . . in the same manner and under the same conditions in every 
respect as liens . . . upon any other separate parcel of real property . . . . " UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 57-8-19(1) (emphasis added). No fictions or artificial devices must be 
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entertained to create liens against condominium units. There is no need to call a ten-plex 
a duplex. Instead, the provisions of the Condominium Ownership Act are "in addition to 
and supplemental to" the Lien Restriction Act and create no conflict. The plain language 
of the Lien Restriction Act applies against condominium units and non-condominium 
units alike. 
D. The Condominium Ownership Act's Provisions Regarding 
Subdivisions and Subdivision Plats Do Not Alter the Lien Restriction 
Act's Definition of "Residence" 
In support of its conclusions, the trial court noted that "a condominium project is 
treated as a subdivision . . . ." (First Findings, Add. 5; Second Findings, Add. 17.) This 
statement is true, subject to certain conditions. Under the Condominium Ownership Act, 
a condominium project "shall be considered to be a subdivision, and a record of survey 
map or supplement thereto . . . shall be considered a subdivision map or plat," but only 
"for purposes of Sections 10-9-805, 10-9-811, and 17-27-804 and provisions of similar 
import and any law or ordinance adopted pursuant thereto." Section 10-9-805 relates to 
the subdivision approval procedure, and Section 10-9-811 relates to prohibited transfers 
of land in an as-yet unapproved subdivision. Section 17-27-804 enumerations the 
requirements that a subdivision plat map be submitted and approved. 
Apparently, the trial court reasoned that if a condominium project is considered a 
subdivision, a condominium unit should be considered a detached dwelling or a 
multifamily dwelling up to two units. However, neither the Condominium Ownership 
15 
Act nor any other statutory or case law supports this reasoning. A condominium project 
is considered a subdivision only for the limited purpose of approving subdivisions and 
subdivision plat maps. Moreover, even if condominium projects were considered 
subdivisions in other contexts, there is nothing magical about a subdivision which 
mandates that its component parcels become "detached single-family dwellings" or a 
"multifamily dwellings up to two units." Regular (i.e., non-condominium) subdivisions 
may contain duplexes or twin homes which would qualify for protection under the Lien 
Restriction Act. Regular subdivisions may also contain tri-plexes and four-plexes which 
do no qualify for those protections. The mere fact that a property is part of a subdivision 
does not necessarily mean that the property qualifies as a "residence" under the Lien 
Restriction Act. 
III. THE UNIT OWNERS' ARGUMENT THAT THE LIEN RESTRICTION 
ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IS NOT BEFORE THIS COURT 
In its Conclusions of Law, the trial court included the following dicta: 
If the definition of "residence" were to be construed as excluding 
condominium units, the [Lien Restriction Act] may be 
unconstitutional under the equal protection provision of the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, § 24. The construction adopted by the court 
avoids this constitutional problem. 
(First Findings, Add. 6; Second Findings, Add. 17-18.) The constitutional argument was 
not properly raised before the trial court and has not been properly presented to this 
Court. 
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The Unit Owners' claim that the Lien Restriction Act's definition of "residence" 
might be unconstitutional was not raised in any of the memoranda filed prior to the 
hearing held on February 4, 2002. The first mention of this argument came during the 
middle of the February 4, 2002 hearing. (Tr. 16-18.) Neither CraCar nor the other lien 
claimants had an opportunity to brief the issue or prepare in advance any responsive oral 
argument. (Tr. 18.) 
The Utah Judicial Code requires parties who are challenging the constitutionality 
of a statute to serve a copy of the proceeding on the attorney general: "[I]f a statute . . . is 
alleged to be invalid the attorney general shall be served with a copy of the proceeding 
and be entitled to be heard." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-33-11. The Unit Owners did not 
comply with this provision because no written documents relating to constitutional 
arguments were served upon the parties or upon the attorney general. These procedural 
irregularities precluded the trial court from ruling on the constitutional issues at the 
February 4, 2002 hearing. 
In any event, the trial court did not determine that any portion of the Lien 
Restriction Fund was unconstitutional. The trial court simply indicated that " i f it 
adopted a certain construction (which it did not), the Lien Restriction Act "may" be 
unconstitutional. Because the trial court ruled on other grounds, its comments regarding 
the constitutionality of the Lien Restriction Act were simply dicta and do not provide a 
basis for upholding the trial court's ruling. 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, CraCar requests that this Court do the following: 
(1) overturn the trial court's Conclusions of Law stating that the units owned by the Unit 
Owners are "residences" under the Lien Restriction Act; (2) reverse the Order and 
Judgment entered by the trial court requiring that mechanic's lien claimants remove their 
mechanic's liens from the Unit Owners' units; and (3) declare that an owner of a unit in a 
condominium building housing ten units is not an owner of a "residence" as that term is 
defined in the Lien Restriction Act. 
DATED this J > 7 ^ day of January, 2003. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Bryan p.. Booth 
Clark B. Fetzer 
Attorneys for Appellant CraCar Construction 
Company 
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This matter came before the court on motions for summary judgment filed by 
defendants Janet Heidt, Guy G. Berryessa, Curt G Hood, and Jennifer C. Smith ("Home 
Owners"). The court heard initial arguments on the motion on September 24, 2001 and 
permitted additional briefing. The motions were heard again on oral argument on February 
4, 2002. 
The court, having reviewed the Home Owners' motions for summary judgment, 
affidavits, and supporting documentation as well as all opposing materials, having 
reviewed exhibits, having heard oral argument, having reviewed the relevant facts and law, 
and otherwise being fully advised in the premises, does hereby make and enter the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant Janet Heidt is the owner of the condominium unit more 
particularly described as 5441 Bobsled Boulevard, No. 200, Park City, Utah. 
2. Janet Heidt entered into a written contract with Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. to 
purchase her condominium unit and occupied the unit within 180 days after completion of 
construction thereof. 
3. Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. was a real estate developer within the meaning of 
38-11-102(19) and 38-11-204(3)(a)(ii) Utah Code Annotated. 
4. Janet Heidt paid Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. in full in accordance with the 




5. Defendant Guy G. Berryessa is the owner of the condominium unit more 
particularly described as 5441 Bobsled Boulevard, No. 204, Park City, Utah. 
6. Guy G. Berryessa entered into a written contract with Bear Hollow Village, 
L.L.C . to purchase his condominium unit and occupied the unit within 180 days after 
completion of construction thereof. 
7. Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. was a real estate developer within the meaning of 
38-11-102(19) and 38-11-204(3)(a)(ii) Utah Code Annotated. 
8. Guy G. Berryessa paid Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. in full in accordance with 
the terms of the written contract. 
9. Defendant Curt G. Hood is the owner of of the condominium unit more 
particularly described as 5441 Bobsled Boulevard, No. 101, Park City, Utah. 
10. Curt G. Hood entered into a written contract with Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. 
to purchase his unit and occupied the unit within 180 days after completion of 
construction thereof. 
11. Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. was a real estate developer within the meaning of 
38-11-102(19) and 38-11-204(3)(a)(ii) Utah Code Annotated. 
12. Curt G. Hood paid Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. in full in accordance with the 
terms oi the written contract. 
13. Defendant Jennifer C. Smith is the owner of the condominium unit more 
particularly described as 5441 Bobsled Boulevard, No. 103, Park City, Utah. * 
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14. Jennifer C. Smith entered into a written contract with Bear Hollow Village, 
L.L.C. to purchase her unit and occupied the unit within 180 days after completion thereof. 
15. Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. was a real estate developer within the meaning of 
38-11-102(19) and 38-11-204(3)(a)(ii) Utah Code Annotated. 
16. Jennifer C. Smith paid Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. in full accordance with the 
terms of the written contract. 
17. Each of the residences listed above is a separate unit located within the 
Calgary Condominium project. The Calgary Condominium project consists of two 
buildings. Each building contains ten separate condominium units. 
Having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters the 
following Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under Utah Code Ann. § 38-11 -102(20), "residence" is defined as "an 
improvement to real property used or occupied, to be used or occupied as, or in 
conjunction with, a primary or secondary detached single-family dwelling or multifamily 
dwelling up to two units, including factory build housing." 
2. This definition focuses on the character of the ownership of the residence. 
The court concludes that so long.as an owner of a residential unit in a condominium 
building does not own more than two units, that owner qualifies for the protection afforded 
by the statute. Consequently, the Court concludes that each of the residential units 
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described in the foregoing Findings of Fact qualifies as a "residence" under Utah Code. 
Ann. §38-11-102(20). 
3. The court's conclusion that the each of the condominium units described in 
the foregoing Findings of Fact qualifies as a "residence" is mandated by the provisions of 
the Condominium Ownership Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-1, et. seq., which provides, 
among other things, that 
(a) liens may be created against each separate condominium unit only in the 
manner applicable to "any other separate parcel of real property subject to 
individual ownership. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-19(1); 
(b) A condominium project is treated as a subdivision and the individual 
units are treated as separate tax parcels for taxation purposes. Jki §§ 57-8-27 and 
-35; and 
(c) The Condominium Ownership Act controls over any conflict with other 
statutory provisions, jd. § 57-8-35. 
4. The court further concludes that interpreting the definition of "residence" in 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102(20) to include a condominium unit occupied as a single 
family residence as stated above is consistent with the purpose and policy of the Residence 
Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act to protect innocent home owners who have 
paid the full purchase price for their homes from mechanic's liens. This policy applies 
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equally to the purchaser of a single family home in a typical subdivision as it does to the 
purchaser of a single family home in a condominium project. 
5. The court further concludes that such construction of the statutory definition of 
"residence" comports with the rule of construction that where two possible interpretations 
of a statute can be made, the constitutional construction should be adopted. Mountain 
States Telephone & Telegraph v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989). If the definition of 
"residence" were to be construed as excluding condominium units, the statute may be 
unconstitutional under the equal protection provision of the Utah Constitution, Article I, 
§ 24. The construction adopted by the court avoids this constitutional problem. 
6. The Home Owner Defendants are entitled to the entry of judgment (a) 
ordering all parties in this action who have filed mechanic's liens against the residences of 
said Defendants to remove said liens within 10 days after receiving notice of the entry of 
judgment and awarding said defendants their costs and attorney's fees as against those 
parties who fail to so remove their liens consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-107(3), 
and (b) dismissing with prejudice all c l^r is filed in this action as against said defendants. 
DATED this cpk^day of I
 7 / ^ U ^ 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
Hdn$?at>le RobertlC. Hilder - , — ^ f 
District Court Judge *. \ t sf 0 
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The court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Home 
Owners' Motions for Summary Judgment and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the motions for summary judgment filed by defendants Janet Heidt, Guy 
G. Berryessa, Curt G. Hood, and Jennifer C. Smith are granted and judgment is hereby 
entered in favor of said defendants dismissing, with prejudice, all claims and causes of 
action asserted herein as against them. 
2. That all parties to this action who have filed mechanic's liens against Unit 200, 
Unit 204, Unit 101, and/or Unit 103 of the Calgary Condominiums located in Park City, 
Summit County, Utah are required to remove said liens within 10 days of receiving notice 
of the entry of this Judgment and Order. 
3. Defendants Janet Heidt, Guy G. Berryessa, Curt G. Hood, and Jennifer C. 
Smith shall be awarded their costs and attorney's fees as against those parties who fail to 
remove their liens as required by the foregoing paragraph 2, as may be established by 
affidavit. 
4. The court hereby determines that there is no just reason for delay in that this 
judgment adjudicates all claims against defendants Janet Heidt, Guy G. Berryessa, Curt G. 
Hood, and Jennifer C. Smith and directs that this judgment be entered as a final judgment 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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DATED this s~V* day of , 2002. 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder 
District Court Judge 
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This matter came before the court on the motions for summary judgment filed by 
certain Home Owner defendants including Ann M. Farley. The court heard initial 
arguments on the motions on September 24, 2001 and permitted additional briefing. The 
motions were heard again on oral argument on February 4, 2002. 
The court, having reviewed the motions for summary judgment, affidavits, and 
supporting documentation as well as all opposing materials, having reviewed exhibits, 
having heard oral argument, having reviewed the relevant facts and law, and otherwise 
being fully advised in the premises, does hereby make and enter the following Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law with respect to Home Owner Ann M. Farley: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant Ann M. Farley is the owner of the condominium unit more 
particularly described as 5441 Bobsled Boulevard, No. 203, Park City, Utah. 
2. Ann M. Farley entered into a written contract with Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. 
to purchase her condominium unit and occupied the unit within 180 days after completion 
of construction thereof. 
3. Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. was a real estate developer within the meaning of 
38-11-102(19) and 38-11-204(3)(a)(ii) Utah Code Annotated. 
4. Ann M. Farley paid Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. in full in accordance with the 
terms of the written contract. 
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5. The residence owned by Ann M. Farley is a separate unit located within the 
Calgary Condominium project. The Calgary Condominium project consists of two 
buildings. Each building contains ten separate condominium units. 
Having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters the 
following Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102(20), "residence" is defined as "an 
improvement to real property used or occupied, to be used or occupied as, or in 
conjunction with, a primary or secondary detached single-family dwelling or multifamily 
dwelling up to two units, including factory build housing." 
2. This definition focuses on the character of the ownership of the residence. 
The court concludes that so long as an owner of a residential unit in a condominium 
building does not own more than two units, that owner qualifies for the protection afforded 
by the statute. Consequently, the court concludes that the residential unit described in the 
foregoing Findings of Fact qualifies as a "residence" under Utah Code. Ann. 
§ 38-11-102(20). 
3. The court's conclusion that the condominium unit described in the foregoing 
Findings of Fact qualifies as a "residence" is mandated by the provisions of the 
Condominium Ownership Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-1, et. seq., which provides, among 
other things, that 
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(a) liens may be created against each separate condominium unit only in the 
manner applicable to "any other separate parcel of real property subject to 
individual ownership. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-19(1); 
(b) A condominium project is treated as a subdivision and the individual 
units are treated as separate tax parcels for taxation purposes, id- §§ 57-8-27 and 
-35; and 
(c) The Condominium Ownership Act controls over any conflict with other 
statutory provisions. ]d. § 57-8-35. 
4. The court further concludes that interpreting the definition of "residence" in 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102(20) to include a condominium unit occupied as a single 
family residence as stated above is consistent with the purpose and policy of the Residence 
Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act to protect innocent home owners who have 
paid the full purchase price for their homes from mechanic's liens. This policy applies 
equally to the purchaser of a single family home in a typical subdivision as it does to the 
purchaser of a single family home in a condominium project. 
5. The court further concludes that such construction of the statutory definition of 
"residence" comports with the rule of construction that where two possible interpretations 
of a statute can be made, the constitutional construction should be adopted. Mountain 
States Telephone & Telegraph v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989). If the definition of 
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"residence" were to be construed as excluding condominium units, the statute may be 
unconstitutional under the equal protection provision of the Utah Constitution, Article I, 
§ 24. The construction adopted by the court avoids this constitutional problem. 
6. Defendant Ann M. Farley is entitled to the entry of judgment (a) ordering all 
parties in this action who have filed mechanic's liens against the residence of said 
defendant to remove said liens within 10 days after receiving notice of the entry of 
judgment and awarding said defendant her costs and attorney's fees as against those parties 
who fail to so remove their liens consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-107(3), and (b) 
dismissing with prejudice all claims filed in this action as against said defendant. 
DATED this _ ^ § / ^ d a y of /y-cyjH^j^ 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
Add-li 
5 
r\ r\ *~ _ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 7-U' day of July, 2002 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON HOME OWNERS' 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Clair J. Jaussi, Esq. 
Randy J. Christiansen, Esq. 
350 East Center Street, Suite 2 
Post Office Box 2282 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Jack L. Schoenhals, Esq. 
420 East South Temple, Suite 355 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Darrel J. Bostwick, Esq. 
Brian J. Babcock, Esq. 
BABCOCK BOSTWICK SCOTT CRAWLEY & PRICE 
57 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gregory J. Sanders, Esq. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John G. Mulliner, Esq. 
363 North University Avenue, Suite 103 
Post Office Box 1045 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Bryan H. Booth, Esq. 
KIRTON McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 Add - ] 
6 0654 
Christopher D. Greenwood, Esq. 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
1840 North State Street, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Dwayne A. Vance, Esq. 
TESCH VANCE & MILLER 
314 Main Street, Suite 201 
Post Office Box 3390 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Janet Heidt 
5441 Bobsled Boulevard, No. 200 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Guy G. Berryessa 
5441 Bobsled Boulevard, No. 204 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Jennifer C. Smith 
Post Office Box 981584 





Deputy Clerk, Sjmrn;* Or 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendant Ann M. Farley and 
Third-Party Defendant Curt G. Hood 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PARK CITY DEPARTMENT 
LKL ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JANET HEIDT; JAMES E. CARUSO; 
WILLIAM JACKSON; JILLIAN 
ANDERSON; ANN M. FARLEY; GUY G. 
BERRYESSA; FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB; 
APPROVED FINANCIAL CORP.; WELLS 
FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.; 
ADVANCE MORTGAGE 
CORPORATION; SUPERIOR 
INSULATION CO.; WESTERN 
WHOLESALE FLOORING; ANDERSON 
LUMBER COMPANY; SUPERIOR 
PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.; JM 
MECHANICAL/SERVICE EXPERTS; AQUA 
BALANCE, INC.; ROB CHLARSON; 
DENNIS SKIBY; and JOHN DOES 1-20; 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 010500202 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Defendants. 
Add-2 
The court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Ann M. 
Farley's Motion for Summary Judgment and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Ann M. Farley is 
granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of said defendant dismissing, with 
prejudice, all claims and causes of action asserted herein as against her. 
2. That all parties to this action who have filed mechanic's liens against Unit 203 
of the Calgary Condominiums located in Park City, Summit County, Utah are required to 
remove said liens within 10 days of receiving notice of the entry of this Order and 
Judgment. 
3. Defendant Ann M. Farley shall be awarded her costs and attorney's fees as 
against those parties who fail to remove their liens as required by the foregoing paragraph 
2, as may be established by affidavit. 
4. The court hereby determines that there is no just reason for delay in that this 
judgment adjudicates all claims against defendant Ann M. Farley and directs that this 





DATED this ^^ay of /4^^t , 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
/- / 
Honc/ra^le RobertlCHiider. , 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the y i - ^day of July, 2002 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Clair J. Jaussi, Esq. 
Randy J. Christiansen, Esq. 
350 East Center Street, Suite 2 
Post Office Box 2282 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Jack L. Schoenhals, Esq. 
420 East South Temple, Suite 355 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Darrel J. Bostwick, Esq. 
Brian J. Babcock, Esq. 
BABCOCK BOSTWICK SCOTT CRAWLEY & PRICE 
57 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gregory J. Sanders, Esq. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John G. Mulliner, Esq. 
363 North University Avenue, Suite 103 
Post Office Box 1045 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Bryan H. Booth, Esq. 
KIRTON McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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Christopher D. Greenwood, Esq. 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
1840 North State Street, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Dwayne A. Vance, Esq. 
TESCH VANCE & MILLER 
314 Main Street, Suite 201 
Post Office Box 3390 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Janet Heidt 
5441 Bobsled Boulevard, No. 200 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Guy G. Berryessa 
5441 Bobsled Boulevard, No. 204 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Jennifer C. Smith 
Post Office Box 981584 
Park City, Utah 84098 
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ORZn 
Determinative Legal Provisions 
Utah Code 
38-1-11. Enforcement - Time for - Lis pendens - Action for debt not affected -
Instructions and form affidavit and motion. 
(1) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter 
within: 
(a) 12 months from the date of final completion of the original contract not 
involving a residence as defined in Section 38-11-102; or 
(b) 180 days from the date the lien claimant last performed labor and services 
or last furnished equipment or material for a residence, as defined in 
Section 38-11-102. 
(2) (a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (1) the lien 
claimant shall file for record with the county recorder of each county in 
which the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency of the action, in the 
manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession of real 
property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who have been 
made parties to the action and persons having actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the action. 
(b) The burden of proof shall be upon the lien claimant and those claiming 
under him to show actual knowledge. 
(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair or affect the right of any person to 
whom a debt may be due for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a 
personal action to recover the same. 
(4) (a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this chapter 
involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien claimant 
shall include with the service of the complaint on the owner of the 
residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's 
rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and 
Lien Recovery Fund Act; and 
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable the 
owner of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner 
may exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence 
Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
(b) The lien claimant may file a notice to submit for decision on the motion for 
summary judgment. The motion may be ruled upon after the service of the 
summons and complaint upon the nonpaying party, as defined in Section 
38-11-102, and the time for the nonpaying party to respond, as provided in 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, has elapsed. 
(c) The instructions and form affidavit and motion required by Subsection 
(4)(a) shall meet the requirements established by rule by the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(d) If the nonpaying party, as defined by Section 38-11-102, files for 
bankruptcy protection and there is a bankruptcy stay in effect, the motion 
for summary judgment and the action to enforce the lien shall be stayed 
until resolution of the related claim under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence 
Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
(e) If a lien claimant fails to provide to the owner of the residence the 
instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a), the lien 
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the 
residence. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§§§ 1390,1395; C.L. 1917, §§§§ 3740, 3745; L. 
1931, ch. 5, §§ 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-11; 1994, ch. 308, §§ 5; 1995, ch. 172, §§ 
2; 2001, ch. 198,§§ 1. 
38-11-102. Definitions. 
(1) "Board" means the Residence Lien Recovery Fund Advisory Board established 
under Section 38-11-104. 
(2) "Construction on an owner-occupied residence" means designing, engineering, 
constructing, altering, remodeling, improving, repairing, or maintaining a new or 
existing residence. 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Commerce. 
(4) "Director" means the director of the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing. 
(5) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. 
(6) "Encumbered fund balance" means the aggregate amount of all outstanding claims 
against the fund. The remainder of monies in the fund are unencumbered funds. 
(7) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Department of 
Commerce. 
(8) "Factory built housing" is as defined in Section 58-56-3. 
(9) "Factory built housing retailer" means a person that sells factory built housing to 
consumers. 
(10) "Fund" means the Residence Lien Recovery Fund established under Section 
38-11-201. 
(11) "Laborer" means a person who provides services at the site of the construction on 
an owner-occupied residence as an employee of an original contractor or other 
qualified beneficiary performing qualified services on the residence. 
(12) "Licensee" means any holder of a license issued under Title 58, Chapters 3a, 22, 
53, and 55. 
(13) "Nonpaying party" means the original contractor, subcontractor, or real estate 
developer who has failed to pay the qualified beneficiary making a claim against 
the fund. 
(14) "Original contractor" means a person who contracts with the owner of real 
property or the ownerfs agent to provide services, labor, or material for the 
construction of an owner-occupied residence. 
(15) "Owner" means a person who: 
(a) contracts with a person who is licensed as a contractor or is exempt from 
licensure under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing 
Act, for the construction on an owner-occupied residence upon real 
property owned by that person; 
(b) contracts with a real estate developer to buy a residence upon completion 
of the construction on the owner-occupied residence; or 
(c) buys a residence from a real estate developer after completion of the 
construction on the owner-occupied residence. 
"Owner-occupied residence" means a residence that is, or after completion of the 
construction on the residence will be, occupied by the owner or the owner's tenant 
or lessee as a primary or secondary residence within 180 days from the date of the 
completion of the construction on the residence. 
"Qualified beneficiary" means a person who: 
(a) provides qualified services; 
(b) pays all necessary fees or assessment required under this chapter; and 
(c) registers with the division: 
(i) as a licensed contractor under Subsection 3 8-11 -3 01 (1) or (2) if that 
person seeks recovery from the fund as a licensed contractor; or 
(ii) as a person providing qualified services other than as a licensed 
contractor under Subsection 38-11-301(3) if the person seeks 
recovery from the fund in a capacity other than as a licensed 
contractor. 
(a) "Qualified services" means the following performed in construction on an 
owner-occupied residence: 
(i) contractor services provided by a contractor licensed or exempt from 
licensure under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades 
Licensing Act; 
(ii) architectural services provided by an architect licensed under Title 
58, Chapter 3a; 
(iii) engineering and land surveying services provided by a professional 
engineer or land surveyor licensed or exempt from licensure under 
Title 58, Chapter 22; 
(iv) landscape architectural services by a landscape architect licensed or 
exempt from licensure under Title 58, Chapter 53; 
(v) design and specification services of mechanical or other systems; 
(vi) other services related to the design, drawing, surveying, 
specification, cost estimation, or other like professional services; 
(vii) providing materials, supplies, components, or similar products; 
(viii) renting equipment or materials; 
(ix) labor at the site of the construction on the owner-occupied 
residence; and 
(x) site preparation, set up, and installation of factory built housing. 
(b) "Qualified services" do not include the construction of factory built 
housing in the factory. 
(19) "Real estate developer" means a person having an ownership interest in real 
property who contracts for the construction of a residence that is offered for sale 
to the public. 
(20) "Residence" means an improvement to real property used or occupied, to be used 
or occupied as, or in conjunction with, a primary or secondary detached single-
family dwelling or multifamily dwelling up to two units, including factory built 
housing. 
(21) "Subsequent owner" means a person who purchases a residence from an owner 
within 180 days from the date of the completion of the construction on the 
residence. 
History: C. 1953,38-11-102, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 308, §§ 7; 1995, ch. 172, §§ 5; 
1998, ch. 13, §§ 45; 1999, ch. 193, §§ 1; 2001, ch. 198, §§ 2. 
38-11-107. Restrictions upon maintaining a lien against residence or owner's 
interest in the residence. 
(1) A person qualified to file a lien upon an owner-occupied residence and the real 
property associated with that residence under the provisions of Title 38, Chapter 
1, Mechanics' Liens, who provides qualified services under an agreement effective 
on or after January 1,1995, other than directly with the owner, shall be barred 
after January 1, 1995, from maintaining a lien upon that residence and real 
property or recovering a judgment in any civil action against the owner or the 
owner-occupied residence to recover monies owed for qualified services provided 
by that person if: 
(a) the conditions described in Subsections 38-1 l-204(3)(a) and (3)(b) are met; 
or 
(b) (i) a subsequent owner purchases a residence from an owner; 
(ii) the subsequent owner who purchased the residence under 
Subsection (l)(b)(i) occupies the residence as a primary or 
secondary residence within 180 days from the date of transfer or the 
residence is occupied by the subsequent owner's tenant or lessee as a 
primary or secondary residence within 180 days from the date of 
transfer; and 
(iii) the owner from whom the subsequent owner purchased the 
residence met the conditions described in Subsections 38-11-
204(3)(a) and (3)(b). 
(2) If a residence is constructed under conditions that do not meet all of the provisions 
of Subsection (1), that residence and the real property associated with that 
residence as defined in Section 38-1-4, shall be subject to any mechanics' lien as 
provided in Section 38-1-3. 
(3) A lien claimant who files a mechanics' lien or foreclosure action upon an owner-
occupied residence is not liable for costs and attorneys' fees under Sections 38-1-
17 and 38-1-18 or for any damages arising from a civil action related to the lien 
filing or foreclosure action if the lien claimant removes the lien within ten days 
from the date the owner establishes compliance, through written findings of fact 
from a court of competent jurisdiction or, in cases where a bankruptcy has been 
filed, from the director, with the requirements of Subsections 38-1 l-204(3)(a) and 
(3)(b). 
History: C. 1953, 38-11-107, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 308, §§ 12; 1995, ch. 172, §§ 8; 
1996, ch. 146, §§ 1; 1998, ch. 49, §§ 2; 2001, ch. 198, §§ 3. 
57-8-19. Liens against units - Removal from lien - Effect of part payment. 
(1) Subsequent to recording the declaration as provided in this act, and while the 
property remains subject to this act, no lien shall thereafter arise or be effective 
against the property. During such period liens or encumbrances shall arise or be 
created only against each unit and the percentage of undivided interest in the 
common areas and facilities appurtenant to such unit in the same manner and 
under the same conditions in every respect as liens or encumbrances may arise or 
be created upon or against any other separate parcel of real property subject to 
individual ownership; provided that no labor performed or materials furnished 
with the consent or at the request of a unit owner or his agent or his contractor or 
subcontractor shall be the basis for the filing of a lien pursuant to the lien law 
against the unit of any other unit owner not expressly consenting to or requesting 
the same, except that such express consent shall be deemed to be given by the 
owner of any unit in the case of emergency repairs. Labor performed or materials 
furnished for the common areas and facilities, if authorized by the unit owners, the 
manager or management committee in accordance with this act, the declaration or 
bylaws or the house rules, shall be deemed to be performed or furnished with the 
express consent of each unit owner and shall be the basis for the filing of a lien 
pursuant to the lien law against each of the units. 
(2) In the event a lien against two or more units becomes effective, the unit owners of 
the separate units may remove their units and the percentage of undivided interest 
in the common areas and facilities appurtenant to such units from the lien by 
payment of the fractional or proportional amount attributable to each of the units 
affected. Such individual payment shall be computed by reference to the 
percentages appearing in the declaration. Subsequent to any payment, discharge or 
other satisfaction, the unit and the percentage of undivided interest in the common 
areas and facilities appurtenant thereto shall be free and clear of the lien so paid, 
satisfied or discharged. Partial payment, satisfaction or discharge shall not prevent 
the lienor from proceeding to enforce his rights against any unit and the 
percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant 
thereto not so paid, satisfied or discharged. 
History: L. 1963, ch. I l l , §§ 19. 
57-8-27. Separate taxation. 
(1) Each unit and its percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and 
facilities shall be considered to be a parcel and shall be subject to separate 
assessment and taxation by each assessing unit and special district for all types of 
taxes authorized by law, including ad valorem levies and special assessments. 
Neither the building or buildings, the property, nor any of the common areas and 
facilities may be considered a parcel. 
(2) In the event any of the interests in real property made subject to this chapter by the 
declaration are leasehold interests, if the lease creating these interests is of record 
in the office of the county recorder, if the balance of the term remaining under the 
lease is at least 40 years at the time the leasehold interest is made subject to this 
chapter, if units are situated or are to be situated on or within the real property 
covered by the lease, and if the lease provides that the lessee shall pay all taxes 
and assessments imposed by governmental authority, then until ten years prior to 
the date that the leasehold is to expire or until the lease is terminated, whichever 
first occurs, all taxes and assessments on the real property covered by the lease 
shall be levied against the owner of the lessee's interest. If the owner of the 
reversion under the lease has executed the declaration and record of survey map, 
until ten years prior to the date that the leasehold is to expire, or until the lease is 
terminated, whichever first occurs, all taxes and assessments on the real property 
covered by the lease shall be separately levied against the unit owners having an 
interest in the lease, with each unit owner for taxation purposes being considered 
the owner of a parcel consisting of his undivided condominium interest in the fee 
of the real property affected by the lease. 
(3) No forfeiture or sale of the improvements or the property as a whole for 
delinquent real estate taxes, special assessments, or charges shall divest or in 
anywise affect the title to an individual unit if the real estate taxes or duly levied 
share of the assessments and charges on the individual unit are currently paid. 
(4) Any exemption from taxes that may exist on real property or the ownership of the 
property may not be denied by virtue of the submission of the property to this 
chapter. 
(5) Timeshare interests and timeshare estates, as defined in Subsection 57-19-2(17), 
may not be separately taxed but shall be valued, assessed, and taxed at the unit 
level. The value of timeshare interests and timeshare estates, for purposes of ad 
valorem taxation, shall be determined by valuing the real property interest 
associated with the timeshare interest or timeshare estate, exclusive of the value of 
any intangible property and rights associated with the acquisition, operation, 
ownership, and use of the timeshare interest or timeshare estate, including the fees 
and costs associated with the sale of timeshare interests and timeshare estates that 
exceed those fees and costs normally incurred in the sale of other similar 
properties, the fees and costs associated with the operation, ownership, and use of 
timeshare interests and timeshare estates, vacation exchange rights, vacation 
conveniences and services, club memberships, and any other intangible rights and 
benefits available to a timeshare unit owner. Nothing in this section shall be 
construed as requiring the assessment of any real property interest associated with 
a timeshare interest or timeshare estate at less than its fair market value. Notice of 
assessment, delinquency, sale, or any other purpose required by law is considered 
sufficient for all purposes if the notice is given to the management committee. 
History: L. 1963, ch. I l l , §§ 27; 1975, ch. 173, §§ 16; 1986, ch. 92, §§ 4; 1987, ch. 
73, §§ 2; 1999, ch. 84, §§ 1. 
57-8-35. Effect of other laws - Compliance with ordinances and codes - Approval 
of projects by municipality or county. 
(1) The provisions of this chapter shall be in addition and supplemental to all other 
provisions of law, statutory or judicially declared, provided that wherever the 
application of the provisions of this chapter conflict with the application of such 
other provisions, this chapter shall prevail: provided further, for purposes of 
Sections 10-9-805, 10-9-811, and 17-27-804 and provisions of similar import and 
any law or ordinance adopted pursuant thereto, a condominium project shall be 
considered to be a subdivision, and a record of survey map or supplement thereto 
prepared pursuant to this chapter shall be considered to be a subdivision map or 
plat, only with respect to: 
(a) such real property or improvements, if any, as are intended to be dedicated 
to the use of the public in connection with the creation of the condominium 
project or portion thereof concerned; and 
(b) those units, if any, included in the condominium project or portion thereof 
concerned which are not contained in existing or proposed buildings. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be interpreted to state or imply that a condominium 
project, unit, association or unit owners, or management committee is exempt by 
this chapter from compliance with the zoning ordinance, building and sanitary 
codes, and similar development regulations which have been adopted by a 
municipality or county. No condominium project or any use within said project or 
any unit or parcel or parcel of land indicated as a separate unit or any structure 
within said project shall be permitted which is not in compliance with said 
ordinances and codes. 
(3) From and after the time a municipality or county shall have established a planning 
commission, no condominium project or any record of survey map, declaration, or 
other material as required for recordation under this chapter shall be recorded in 
the office of the county recorder unless and until the following mentioned 
attributes of said condominium project shall have been approved by the 
municipality or county in which it is located. In order to more fully avail itself of 
this power, the legislative body of a municipality or county may provide by 
ordinance for the approval of condominium projects proposed within its limits. 
This ordinance may include and shall be limited to a procedure for approval of 
condominium projects, the standards and the criteria for the geographical layout of 
a condominium project, facilities for utility lines and roads which shall be 
constructed, the percentage of the project which must be devoted to common or 
recreational use, and the content of the declaration with respect to the standards 
which must be adhered to concerning maintenance, upkeep, and operation of any 
roads, utility facilities, recreational areas, and open spaces included in the project. 
(4) Any ordinance adopted by the legislative body of a municipality or county which 
outlines the procedures for approval of a condominium project shall provide for: 
(a) a preliminary approval, which, among other things, will then authorize the 
developer of the condominium project to proceed with the project; and 
(b) a final approval which will certify that all of the requirements set forth in 
the preliminary approval either have been accomplished or have been 
assured of accomplishment by bond or other appropriate means. No 
declaration or record of survey map shall be recorded in the office of the 
county recorder until a final approval has been granted. 
History: L. 1963, ch. I l l , §§ 35; 1975, ch. 173, §§ 18; 1995, ch. 20, §§ 97; 1997, ch. 
142, §§ 4. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law 
certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, 
judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final 
judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating 
with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources 
reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the 
United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first 
degree felony or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court 
of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on 
legislative subpoenas. 
The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over 
which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court 
of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of 
certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme 
Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under 
Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 47, §§ 41; 1987, ch. 161, §§ 303; 
1988, ch. 248, §§ 5; 1989, ch. 67, §§ 1; 1992, ch. 127, §§ 11; 1994, ch. 191, §§ 2; 1995, 
ch. 267, §§ 5; 1995, ch. 299, §§ 46; 1996, ch. 159, §§ 18; 2001, ch. 302, §§ 1. 
78-33-11. Parties. 
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any 
interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice 
the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding which involves the 
validity of a municipal or county ordinance or franchise such municipality or county shall 
be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if a statute or state franchise or 
permit is alleged to be invalid the attorney general shall be served with a copy of the 
proceeding and be entitled to be heard. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 58, §§ 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-33-11. 
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